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Michael Mussa
Economic activities in different areas of the world are linked through
commodity trade, factor movements, flows of financial claims, and trans-
fers of knowledge and technology. Economic integration of the world
economy is not complete because there are both natural and artificial
barriers that inhibit full integration. The natural barriers include the real
costs of moving goods and factors from one place to another, the differ-
ences in language and culture that diminish the benefits and increase the
costs of labor migration, the real costs of securing information and
conducting transactions in financial claims issued in different areas of the
world, and the differences in education and training that interfere with
the transfer of knowledge and technology. The artificial barriers to full
economic integration include all of the distortions and inefficiencies
created by the failure of market mechanisms and by government policies
that interfere with commodity trade, factor movements, flows of financial
claims, or transfers of knowledge and technology.
The question of optimal economic integration is the question of how
economic policies should be structured to achieve the degree of integra-
tion of economic activities in different regions that maximizes some
sensible measure of social welfare. One possible answer is that economic
policies should be structured so that they do not themselves create
artificial barriers to integration ancl so that they countervail the artificial
barriers that would otherwise result from defects in the operation of
market mechanisms. No formal proof can be given that this policy pre-
scription will always lead to an improvement in potential economic
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welfare in the sense of Samuelson (1950), but analyses of specific issues
relating to economic integration (such as the analysis of the global ben-
efits of a general policy of free trade) indicate that this prescription
provides the only possible general answer to the broad question of
optimal economic integration. Nevertheless, in this paper it will be
argued that the general policy prescription to avoid creating artificial
barriers to economic integration and to countervail other artificial bar-
riers is not a realistic and appropriate guide for the structuring of policies
that affect economic integration. Moreover, it will be argued that there is
no general prescription for policies that will serve the broad objective of
optimal economic integration. The most that economic analysis can
provide is an evaluation of the policies that will serve reasonably well-
defined and specific objectives with respect to economic integration,
given the limitations within which these policies must operate.
The central thesis of this paper is developed by discussing the four
major impediments to any general prescription of policies to achieve
optimal economic integration and then suggesting some principles that
are relevant in applying economic analysis to more limited questions of
economic integration. The first impediment to a general theory of opti-
mal economic integration, which is considered in section 2.1, is the
problem of defining a welfare criterion to use when evaluating policies
that affect economic integration. This problem is more severe than the
usual difficulties associated with interpersonal utility comparisons. Deci-
sions about policies that affect economic integration are usually taken by
government authorities who both assign special weight to the economic
welfare of their own citizens (or to particular groups of citizens) and
sometimes pursue policies that are not clearly motivated by any reason-
able concept of economic welfare. The second impediment (section 2.2)
is that government authorities are subject to a wide variety of constraints
on the policies that they can adopt and on the effectiveness with which
these policies can be pursued. The extent and diversity of these con-
straints render the search for a general theory of optimal economic
integration virtually hopeless. The third impediment to any such theory
(section 2.3) arises from the fundamental principle of second-best welfare
analysis. Specifically, in economies with a multiplicity of distortions, the
optimal economic policy with respect to any particular distortion (such as
an artificial barrier) depends, in general, on all of the other distortions of
the economic system. The fourth impediment (section 2.4) is that policies
that affect different dimensions of economic integration (commodity
trade, factor movements, flows of financial claims, and transfers of tech-
nology) cannot, in general, be evaluated separately. This is true because
the extent of economic integration is one dimension usually affects the
desirable extent of such integration in other dimensions.43 Optimal Economic Integration
2.1 Problems with Specifying an Appropriate Welfare Criterion
In analyzing issues of optimal economic policy, a welfare criterion is
needed on which to base measurements of the relative desirability of the
outcomes of different policies. The standard welfare criterion that is
employed in economic analysis is the criterion of potential welfare im-
provement; that is, a policy is said to be welfare improving if the adoption
of the policy allows some individuals economic gain without causing other
individuals economic loss. Frequently, to insure that no individual suffers
economic loss, it would be necessary for compensation to be paid by
those who gain from a particular policy to those who lose from the policy.
However, such compensation need not be paid for a policy to be judged
"welfare improving," if it can reasonably be argued that the government
authority is capable of evaluating the welfares of different individuals and
determining and effectuating the appropriate amount of compensation.
Unfortunately, this general criterion of potential welfare improvement
cannot realistically be applied in analyzing many important issues relating
to economic integration. One important problem relates to the scope of
the welfare criterion: Whose welfare is counted in deciding on a desirable
policy? This problem is well illustrated by the standard analysis of the
optimum tariff. A country that is large enough to influence the price that
it pays for its imports can improve the welfare of its residents by exploit-
ing its monopoly power in trade through the imposition of an import
tariff. If the scope of the welfare criterion is limited to the residents of that
country, then the imposition of a tariff is welfare improving. However, a
tariff is not welfare improving from the perspective of the world as a
whole, since the benefits to the residents of the tariff-imposing country
are smaller than the losses to the rest of the world. Nevertheless, a
government that is exclusively concerned with the economic welfare of
domestic residents would find it attractive to restrict trade through the
imposition of an optimum tariff.
Another problem related to the scope of the welfare criterion is the
absence of any assured means of paying compensation across interna-
tional boundaries. If a tariff-imposing country were always required to
pay appropriate compensation to other countries injured by its actions,
then the argument for the optimum tariff would disappear. However,
there is no mechanism to insure that such compensation would be paid,
and it is probably appropriate to assume that most governments place
greater emphasis on improving the economic welfare of their own resi-
dents than on improving that of the residents of other countries.
An interesting example of the problems arising from the lack of an
adequate and assured means of compensation arises in connection with
the migration of skilled labor—the "brain drain" problem (see the papers44 Michael Mussa
in Adams 1968). A policy of limiting migration of skilled workers is likely
to be supported by skilled workers already resident in high-income
countries because they would sustain an uncompensated loss from im-
migration of additional skilled workers. Similarly, unskilled workers in
low-income countries may favor restrictions on migration of skilled work-
ers because they too would suffer an uncompensated loss. The skilled
workers who would like to migrate from a low-income country to a
high-income country would undoubtedly enjoy benefits from migration,
but their welfare may have low weight in the welfare index of policymak-
ers in both countries.
From a cosmopolitan viewpoint, of course, it is attractive to argue that
the scope of the appropriate welfare criterion used in analyzing issues of
economic integration should be very broad—indeed, that it should en-
compass the economic welfare of the residents of all countries, and that it
should envision appropriate compensatory payments both within and
across national boundaries. However, decisions about policies that affect
economic integration are usually made by sovereign governments that
assign the greatest weight to improving the economic welfare of domestic
residents and that generally deny responsibility for making compensatory
payments to residents of other countries who may be harmed by their
policies. Policies that either promote or restrict economic integration
(such as tariffs or limitations on labor migration) frequently have differ-
ent effects on the economic welfare of the residents of different countries.
Together, these facts imply that even if attention is restricted to the
economic effects of policies that affect economic integration, it is fre-
quently difficult to make any prescription for optimal policy because what
is optimal from the perspective of one country is not optimal from the
perspective of another.
The analysis of optimal policies with respect to economic integration is
further confounded by divergences between the usual conception of
economic welfare and the broader conception of national welfare that
appears to motivate the actions of many national governments. Portfirio
Diaz, the long-time president of Mexico, once summarized the problems
of his country as follows: "Poor Mexico, so far from God, so near to the
United States." Eighty years later, similar sentiments are reflected in the
policies of the Mexican government that are directed to maintaining a
degree of economic independence from the United States, regardless of
what may be the (narrowly defined) economic benefits of closer inter-
dependence. Policies of the Canadian government which seek to promote
greater domestic ownership of companies engaged in exploration and
development of Canadian energy resources reflect a similar desire for
economic independence.
Trading relations among countries are frequently influenced by politi-45 Optimal Economic Integration
cal considerations that are not easily represented in any measure of
economic welfare. The nature and extent of trading relations among the
Eastern bloc countries are clearly related to their political relationship.
The changing attitude of the United States toward trade with the People's
Republic of China is also clearly related to political developments and
broader strategic objectives. The development of the European Eco-
nomic Community is, at least in part, an expression of the desire for
greater political unity among its member countries.
Policies affecting labor migration are another area in which noneco-
nomic concerns weigh heavily. Some of these concerns were expressed
with unusual forthrightness by a senior Australian politician who pro-
claimed that his policy was, "Two wongs don't make a white." Some
native Malay politicians have expressed opposition, perhaps in somewhat
more refined terms, to further growth of the Chinese minority in Ma-
laysia through immigration of former Chinese residents of Vietnam. In
the United States, domestic political opposition has clearly been an
important factor motivating recent attempts to limit immigration of refu-
gees both from Southeast Asia and from the Caribbean. Nevertheless,
the acceptable flow of refugees and other immigrants into the United
States (which has a long tradition of a relatively liberal immigration
policy) has been considerably greater than the flow into Japan (which has
an even longer tradition of opposition to immigration).
Since policies concerning foreign investment, international trade, and
labor migration are strongly influenced by noneconomic objectives, an
exclusively economic criterion of national welfare cannot provide a reli-
able guide for the policies that sovereign governments will want to pursue
with respect to these key dimensions of economic integration. Differ-
ences in the noneconomic objectives of different societies and conflicts
between these objectives mean that it is impossible to construct a general
welfare criterion that will serve as the basis for a general prescription of
policies to meet the objective of optimal economic integration.
2.2 Constraints on Government Policy
A second major obstacle to any general theory of optimal economic
integration arises from the many constraints that are imposed on govern-
ment policies and the lack of uniformity in those constraints. These
constraints may be divided into three broad categories: First, political
and legal constraints are placed on policies that directly affect commodity
trade, factor movements, flows of financial claims, or transfers of know-
ledge and technology. Second, practical constraints on the effectiveness
of these policies arise from the desire and capacity of private agents to
avoid or evade government controls, regulations, or taxes. Third, con-46 Michael Mussa
straints on policies that governments can pursue with respect to economic
integration arise from policies that are adopted to serve other political
and social objectives.
Political and legal constraints severely restrict the policies that can be
employed to affect regional economic integration within a sovereign
nation. The state of California, which is economically about the same size
as Canada, does not have the same flexibility as Canada in adopting
policies that affect its economic integration with the rest of the United
States. The state of California cannot impose tariff barriers or import
quotas to protect its domestic industries from competition with the rest of
the United States. Nor can it restrict the free movement of labor and
capital to and from the rest of the United States (except to a minor extent
through licensing of professionals and zoning restrictions on the use of
property). Nor can it decide, like Canada, to float the exchange rate
between its money and the money of the rest of the United States.
Political and legal constraints also restrict the policies that sovereign
nations can adopt with respect to economic integration with other na-
tions. The threat of foreign retaliation and the legal and moral force of
international agreements concerning commercial and financial policies
limit the freedom of national governments to restrict commodity trade
and, to a lesser extent, international capital flows. Members of the
European Economic Community, and other regional economic organiza-
tions, accept limits on their freedom to restrict movements of goods and
factors to and from other member countries. These limits cannot always
or easily be articulated at the margin, at the convenience of a member
government.
The practical constraints on the effectiveness of government policies
that directly affect economic integration are well illustrated by the prac-
tices of smuggling and under-invoicing and over-invoicing import and
export transactions as means of evading tariffs, export taxes, and other
restrictions on commodity trade. The relevance of such evasive practices
for the theory of international commercial policy has recently received
considerable attention in academic literature (Bhagwati 1973). The prac-
tical importance of such evasive practices is indicated both by the in-
capacity (or unwillingness) of government authorities to suppress the
narcotics trade and by the limited success of economic sanctions and
embargoes.
Policies that attempt to limit international mobility of factors of pro-
duction are also avoided and evaded on a wide scale. Controls on move-
ments of financial capital can sometimes be enforced with some degree of
effectiveness on large institutions, such as banks and corporations. They
are notoriously difficult to enforce, however, on individual asset holders.
Illegal migration vitiates policies that attempt to restrict the international
mobility of labor. This is especially true for migration of labor from47 Optimal Economic Integration
Mexico to the United States, which could be halted only by draconian
measures that would be unacceptable to both the United States and
Mexico.
Black markets in foreign exchange are a mechanism through which
private economic agents can partially circumvent government policies
that interfere with economic integration by maintaining unrealistic of-
ficial exchange rates between domestic money and foreign monies. The
importance of such black markets is illustrated by the fact that in many
countries when the difference between a black market exchange rate and
an official exchange rate becomes large, a government is usually com-
pelled to alter the official exchange rate to bring it into closer correspond-
ence with the black market rate.
The Eurodollar market provides an outstanding example of the means
that private agents can use to circumvent government restrictions on
international financial flows. A major stimulus to the original develop-
ment of this market came from the interest equalization tax which was
imposed by the Kennedy administration in an attempt to discourage
capital outflows from the United States. The desire of banks and their
customers to avoid the tax on bank intermediation activities, which is
implicit in reserve requirements on domestic bank deposits and in other
forms of bank regulations, has provided continued stimulus for the
growth of the Euromarket (see, e.g., Swoboda 1968).
Replacement of domestic money holdings with foreign money holdings
is one means by which the residents of a country can avoid the inflationary
tax on their cash balances that is induced by excessive domestic money
creation. Currency replacement also allows domestic residents to escape
from the disadvantages of an unstable domestic standard of value by
using foreign money as the nominal unit of account for private agree-
ments and transactions. Fear of large-scale currency replacement can
become a significant constraint on the policies that a government adopts
with respect to both exchange rates and the domestic money supply.
Government policies that are not specifically directed at commodity
trade, factor movements, or monetary relations may nevertheless have
important indirect effects on economic integration. In many cases poli-
cies that are not directed toward economic integration serve very impor-
tant social and political objectives and are, for this reason, difficult to
alter. These policies should be regarded as constraints on the overall
flexibility of government policy in addressing issues related to economic
integration.
For example, many countries have established policies of providing
assistance to individuals and businesses in economic difficulty. This assist-
ance takes several forms, including unemployment compensation, re-
location assistance, special tax benefits, public purchases of products of
distressed industries, outright subsidies, implicit subsidies through low48 Michael Mussa
interest rate loans, and public financing of enterprises taken over by
government authorities. Whatever its form, such assistance almost inevit-
ably distorts the incentives that individuals and businesses have to adjust
to changing economic conditions, thereby affecting the social benefit or
cost of policies that promote or inhibit economic integration.
In many countries, the conduct of macroeconomic policy is strongly
influenced by objectives of domestic economic stabilization, particularly
the maintenance of a high level of employment and an acceptable rate of
inflation. When these objectives appear to conflict with policies that
promote monetary integration, integration of financial markets, or in-
tegration through commodity trade and factor mobility, these policies are
frequently sacrificed. The breakdown of the Bretton Woods system in
1971 occurred primarily because the United States wanted to pursue an
expansionary monetary policy to fight a domestic recession (and to
finance a war), and because other countries, especially West Germany,
were unwilling to accept a domestic inflation rate that was consistent with
the U.S. monetary expansion. The resort to highly protectionist policies
by many countries during the 1930s was motivated largely by a desire to
stimulate domestic employment and a belief that restrictions on imports
would have an employment-stimulating effect. The decision by the
Reagan administration to forego its general commitment to free trade
and persuade the Japanese government to impose "voluntary" restraints
on exports of automobiles to the United States is more recent evidence
of the same important influence that domestic political and social con-
cerns have on the conduct of policies that affect international economic
integration.
The implication of all these constraints on the formulation and conduct
of government policies that directly or indirectly affect economic integra-
tion is that issues of economic integration cannot generally be addressed
by first-best policies that would remove or countervail all artificial bar-
riers to complete economic integration. In some cases, these first-best
policies may simply not be available to the relevant government author-
ity. In other cases, the government authority may not be able to effec-
tively implement the required policies. In still other cases, policies that
governments pursue for reasons not directly related to economic integra-
tion may have side effects that significantly influence the consequences of
policies affecting economic integration. Since these constraints on gov-
ernment policy are not the same for all governments, a general prescrip-
tion of policies to achieve optimal economic integration is not possible.
2.3 Difficulties of Second-Best Welfare Analysis
A third fundamental difficulty which confronts any general theory of
optimal economic integration arises from the basic principle of second-49 Optimal Economic Integration
best welfare analysis. This principle states that in an economy where a
multiplicity of distortions induce divergences between privately per-
ceived values and costs and true social values and costs, policies that
reduce the magnitude of any one distortion (or group of distortions) may
not improve economic welfare because they may exacerbate the delete-
rious effects of other distortions. For this reason, the second-best policy
for any particular issue of economic integration is generally not the same
as the first-best policy that would be appropriate if there were no other
distortions in the economic system and no constraints on the policies that
a government could adopt and effectively implement. The second-best
policy for a particular issue of economic integration cannot be prescribed
in general terms because it depends on the other distortions that are
present in the economic system and on the constraints that impinge on
government policy.
The difficulties of analyzing issues of economic integration that are
created by the application of second-best welfare analysis are well illus-
trated by analysis of the economic benefits and costs of customs unions—
the issue for which second-best welfare analysis was originally developed
(Viner 1950; Lipsey and Lancaster 1956). A customs union promotes
economic integration through commodity trade for the countries that are
members of the union by removing tariffs and other artificial impedi-
ments to trade within the union and by erecting a common external tariff
for goods imported from outside the union. The formation of such a
union is beneficial to its members to the extent that the elimination of
tariff barriers between members of the union creates trade that would not
otherwise have existed. The formation of such a union is harmful to its
members to the extent that the elimination of tariff barriers within the
union and the retention of a tariff on imports from outside the union
diverts trade which would otherwise have occurred between members
and nonmembers. The total effect of the customs union may be either to
increase or decrease the economic welfare of the member countries,
depending on whether the benefits of trade creation do or do not out-
weigh the losses from trade diversion. No general answer can be given to
the question of whether this form of economic integration is beneficial to
the countries that undertake it.
This analysis of the benefits and costs of customs unions extends to
arrangements that would allow free mobility of factors of production
within a group of countries or regions, but that restrict factor movements
between this group and the rest of the world. For example, it is a common
practice in most countries to permit free movement of capital and labor
between regions within the country but to restrict movements of capital
and especially labor to or from other countries. Another example is the
adoption by the European Economic Community of a policy of free
mobility of labor for citizens of the member countries of the community,50 Michael Mussa
combined with a continuation of restrictions on labor immigration from
countries outside of the community. Such arrangements presumably
generate economic benefits to the extent that they allow for movements
of factors within the community that would not otherwise have occurred,
but they also generate losses by displacing factor movements that would
have occurred between members and nonmembers of the community.
Another application of second-best welfare analysis to an issue of
factor mobility is to the "brain drain" problem (see the papers in Adams
1968). The United States and other advanced countries apply easier
standards for immigration of highly skilled labor than for immigration of
unskilled labor. In accord with the general principle of second-best
welfare analysis, there should be a direct benefit from reducing barriers
to migration of skilled workers, as reflected in a reduction in the wage
differential for skilled workers between the advanced and the less ad-
vanced countries. But there should also be an indirect loss from reducing
barriers to migration of skilled while retaining barriers to migration for
unskilled labor, as reflected in an increase in the wage differential for
unskilled workers between the advanced and less advanced economies.
With respect to issues of financial integration, one key application of
second-best welfare analysis is to the question of optimum currency areas
(Mundell 1961; McKinnon 1963). If all prices and wages were perfectly
flexible and if factors of production were freely mobile among regions,
then the optimum monetary system would be a unified currency used in
all regions. In other words, the optimum currency area would be the
whole world. This is the first-best policy that allows for maximum ex-
ploitation of the social benefits of money. However, when there are
rigidities of prices and wage rates and barriers to free mobility of factors
of production, economic disturbances may lead to excess supply and
unemployment in some regions, together with excess demand and pro-
duction bottlenecks in others. In this situation, optimum currency areas
would be regions within which there is a high degree of mobility of factors
of production and for which the composition of output is relatively
homogeneous. Flexible exchange rates between the monies of these
regions would allow the effects of economic disturbances to be partially
absorbed by variations in the relative prices of their outputs, achieved by
variations in nominal exchange rates. Thus, the argument for regional
currency areas is a second-best argument—this arrangement balances the
losses from impairing the functions of money with the benefits of reduc-
ing the costs associated with the distortions created by barriers to factor
mobility and sticky prices and wages.
A similar kind of second-best reasoning is employed in recent theoret-
ical analyses of the relative virtues of fixed and flexible exchange rates
(Fischer 1973). In the models that are the bases of these analyses, it is
usually the case that a fixed exchange rate regime allows the economic51 Optimal Economic Integration
system to deal better with certain types of disturbances, particularly
monetary ones, but that a flexible exchange rate regime allows the
economic system to deal better with other types of disturbances, particu-
larly real disturbances requiring adjustments in the relative prices of the
outputs of different nations. The choice of a fixed or a flexible exchange
rate regime, therefore, is not the choice of the first-best regime that is best
in dealing with all types of disturbances; it is the choice of the second-best
regime that is best on average for the type and magnitude of disturbances
that impinge on the economic system.
Another application of second-best reasoning to an issue of financial
integration is in the analysis of dual exchange rate systems. Under such a
system, a country usually establishes a fixed exchange rate for current
account transactions, but allows the exchange rate for capital account
transactions to fluctuate in response to market pressures. The argument
in favor of such an exchange rate system is not a first-best argument. Such
a system creates distortions by introducing two prices for the same good
(foreign exchange), it imposes significant monitoring and policing costs
on the government and on private agents, and it creates a barrier to the
international mobility of financial claims. The argument for a dual ex-
change rate is that the costs of these distortions are outweighed by the
benefits of reducing excessive fluctuations of the exchange rate for cur-
rent account transactions that would otherwise be induced by speculative
capital movements.
The general principle that emerges from all of these examples of the
application of second-best welfare analysis to issues of economic integra-
tion is that it is not possible to arrive at a general prescription of the best
policies to pursue with respect to commodity trade, factor movements,
and financial relations. For each of these dimensions of economic integra-
tion, the best policy (from an economic viewpoint) depends on a multi-
plicity of distortions that cause privately perceived costs and benefits to
diverge from true social costs and benefits. The inconclusive results of
analyses of the costs and benefits of customs unions, of the appropriate
size of optimum currency areas, of the relative merits of fixed and flexible
exchange rates, and of the advantages and disadvantages of dual ex-
change rate regimes illustrate the impossibility of arriving at any general
prescription of policies to achieve optimal economic integration.
2.4 Interaction among Channels of Integration
The fourth major barrier to a general theory of optimal economic
integration arises from the interdependence among alternative channels
of integration. The degree of international mobility of factors of produc-
tion influences the costs and benefits of international trade in commod-
ities. Conversely, the extent of natural and artificial barriers to commodi-52 Michael Mussa
ty trade affects the incentives for, and the consequences of, movements
of factors of production. The extent of economic integration through
commodity trade and factor mobility has important implications for the
effects of alternative arrangements governing flows of financial claims
and exchanges of national monies. Because of these interactions, ques-
tions of optimal policy with respect to different channels of economic
integration cannot be treated separately. A general theory of optimal
economic integration would have to be a theory that dealt with all forms
of integration simultaneously.
The classic example of interaction among alternative channels of eco-
nomic integration is provided by the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem: A coun-
try tends to export the commodities that use intensively the factors of
production in which that country is abundant. In establishing this
theorem, it is assumed that productive technologies are similar in differ-
ent countries, but that factors of production are not mobile among
countries. It follows that at given commodity prices, a country that is
relatively heavily endowed with some factor of production, say land, will
produce relatively large amounts of commodities that are intensive in the
use of land, in comparison with the production of such land-intensive
commodities in countries where land is not abundant. International trade
in commodities allows the land-abundant country to export some of the
land-intensive commodities that are efficiently produced in that country,
in return for imports of commodities that intensively use factors that are
abundant in other countries. Thus, the essential idea of the Heckscher-
Ohlin theorem is that commodity trade will substitute for movements of
factors of production when such movements are restricted by either
natural or artificial barriers.
The converse of the Heckscher-Ohlin theorem is embodied in Mun-
dell's (1957) theorem concerning the effects of a tariff in a world of
physical capital mobility. Under the assumptions of the two-sector model
developed by Stolper and Samuelson (1941) and by Lerner (1952), Mun-
dell shows that when one factor of production, capital, is mobile between
countries, even a small tariff on commodity trade will lead to the com-
plete elimination of all trade. The essential idea that underlies Mundell's
result is that factor mobility is a substitute (in his model, a perfect
substitute) for commodity trade. Hence, when international economic
integration through commodity trade is interfered with by the imposition
of a tariff, resort is made to the alternative channel, international capital
movements, as the mechanism for achieving economic integration.
The theory of effective protection (Corden 1966; Johnson 1969) re-
veals another aspect of the substitution between commodity trade and
factor movements. This theory recognizes that a tariff imposed on an
intermediate good implies negative protection for producers of final
goods that employ this intermediate good as an input. For this reason, a53 Optimal Economic Integration
barrier to factor mobility in the form of trade restrictions applied to
intermediate goods is likely to stimulate increased trade in the final goods
that embody these intermediate goods. Conversely, a barrier to trade in
final goods creates an incentive for factor movements in the form of
increased trade in intermediate goods.
Recent experience provides a number of illustrations of substitution
between commodity trade and factor movements. Protection afforded by
the United States to domestic textile and shoe manufacturers has been a
stimulus to legal and illegal immigration of low-wage workers into the
United States. The common external tariff erected by the European
Economic Community and the removal of tariff barriers within the
community have been stimuli to American firms to locate production
facilities within the community or to acquire European firms that possess
such facilities. The barriers to the importation of foreign steel into the
United States have been one of the factors that have contributed to the
lack of competitiveness of the U.S. auto industry and to increased auto
imports. High tariffs on imports of automobiles imposed by many Latin
American countries, on the other hand, have created an incentive for
domestic assembly of automobiles using imported parts.
From these examples, it should not be concluded that commodity trade
and factor mobility are only and always substitute channels of economic
integration. If production processes are subject to increasing returns to
scale, then both commodity trade and factor movements will generally be
required to achieve an efficient pattern of production. If the scale of
operations required to achieve reasonable efficiency in an industry is
large, then a relatively small country that stimulates domestic develop-
ment of this industry by severely restricting imports of the industry's
product may acquire a very inefficient domestic industry. This apparently
has been a problem with the import-substitution policies that have been
adopted by a number of developing countries.
The correct conclusion to draw from the interactions between com-
modity trade and factor movements is that optimal economic policy for
commodity trade cannot be analyzed separately from optimal economic
policy for factor movements. The general principle of second-best wel-
fare analysis (discussed in section 2.3) implies that when both commodity
trade and factor mobility are subject to important distortions, a policy
that generates benefits by reducing distortions to one channel of eco-
nomic integration may create losses by exacerbating distortions in an-
other channel of integration.
The interactions among channels of economic integration also involve
interactions between arrangements governing transfers of financial
claims (both monies and securities) and commodity trade and factor
mobility. One aspect of these interactions is the linkage between move-
ments of capital as a factor of production and transfers of securities54 Michael Mussa
representing claims to future income. At the aggregate level, if a country
wishes to accumulate productive capital more rapidly than at the rate
permitted by domestic saving, it must finance the excess of investment
over saving in the world "capital market"; that is, in the world market for
financial claims to future income streams. At the microeconomic level,
mobility of specific types of productive capital may be linked to mobility
of specific types of financial claims. In particular, when productive capital
includes specialized knowledge or technology that is the property of a
foreign firm, and when use of this knowledge or technology cannot be
acquired through a license, then limitations on foreign ownership may
represent a significant barrier to domestic production of commodities
requiring the special knowledge or technology.
Interactions between transfers of financial claims and movements of
goods and factors are especially important in influencing the international
transmission of macroeconomic disturbances. When the monetary units
of two countries are linked through a fixed exchange rate, the general
levels of prices in these countries should move together over long periods
of time, as required by purchasing power parity (allowing, of course, for
differential price-level movements required to compensate for changes in
relative prices). The speed with which price disturbances are transmitted
from one country to another is likely to depend on the extent of trade and
factor mobility. If a large fraction of the goods produced and consumed in
the two countries are traded between them and if factors can move easily
between them, then price disturbances should be transmitted quite rap-
idly, as they appear to be within countries. However, if trade and factor
movements are impeded by extensive natural and artificial barriers, then
transmission of price disturbances will probably occur more slowly, and
more as a consequence of money supply adjustments necessitated by
payments imbalances than as a consequence of direct transmission of
price changes from one country to another. Moreover, this principle
applies not only to disturbances affecting price levels (whether these
disturbances be "monetary" or "real"), but also to disturbances affecting
output and employment levels. In general, the more integrated two
economies are through trade and factor movements, the easier and more
rapid the transmission of macroeconomic disturbances should be be-
tween them. It follows that the more integrated two economies are
through trade and factor movements, the less latitude national govern-
ments have in pursuing independent macroeconomic policies (see
Frenkel and Mussa 1981 for further discussion).
International capital mobility, in the sense of free movement of non-
monetary financial claims between countries, contributes another
mechanism for the rapid transmission of macroeconomic disturbances
(Mundell 1968; Frenkel and Rodriguez 1975). When exchange rates are
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reserve holdings requiring adjustments in national money stocks will
occur rapidly in response to desired portfolio shifts by private agents.
This allows monetary disturbances that affect prices and output in one
country to be rapidly transmitted into monetary disturbances that affect
prices and output in other countries. Easy mobility of financial claims also
allows for international transmission of "real" disturbances (disturbances
affecting desired spending in different countries) when exchange rates
are flexible. Specifically, when financial claims are traded among private
agents, the incipient trade deficit generated by an increase in desired
spending (relative to income) in one country can be financed by a private
financial capital flow, thereby creating an increase in demand for goods in
other countries. In the absence of private capital flows, there would be no
way to finance the incipient trade imbalance, and exchange rate adjust-
ments would forestall transmission of much of a domestic spending
disturbance to other countries.
All of these examples illustrate interactions among alternative chan-
nels of economic integration that have potentially important implications
for the conduct of government policies. It follows from these examples
that all of the problems of specifying an appropriate welfare criterion, of
taking account of the constraints on government policy, and of conduct-
ing complicated and frequently inconclusive second-best welfare analyses
apply not only to each of the channels of economic integration considered
separately, but also to designing an optimal set of policies that affect all
channels of economic integration simultaneously.
2.5 Conclusion
The preceding discussion has emphasized the impediments to a general
theory of optimal economic integration that seeks to provide a prescrip-
tion of the best policies to pursue with respect to commodity trade, factor
movements, and transfers of financial claims. These barriers, however,
do not preclude a great deal of useful economic analysis about the
consequences of specific policies affecting economic integration under-
taken by particular nations. In concluding this paper, a few relevant
principles are suggested for considering specific issues of economic in-
tegration.
First, the performance of the world economy since the Second World
War has demonstrated the substantial advantage accruing to all nations
from an international economic order that permits a high degree of
economic integration through commodity trade, movements of financial
capital, and transfers of knowledge and technology. It is in the general
interest of all nations to insure that the benefits derived from this liberal
international economic order are not lost by a move backward into
protectionism, rigid capital controls, and other policies of economic56 Michael Mussa
disintegration. This does not imply that complete free trade and removal
of all barriers to movements of financial capital and physical factors of
production lead to the optimal degree of economic integration for every
nation. But it does imply a presumption against erecting artificial barriers
to economic integration in the absence of convincing arguments in favor
of such barriers. Moreover, since the imposition of such barriers by one
nation may weaken general political support for a liberal international
economic order, in that nation and in other nations, there is additional
reason to be cautious when moving in the direction of greater barriers to
international economic integration.
Second, since decisions about policies affecting international economic
integration are usually made by sovereign governments primarily con-
cerned with their national welfare, attention must be focused on policies
that will improve the national welfare of the countries that adopt them.
The effects of such policies on the welfare of particular groups within a
country will, of course, frequently be an important concern. However,
mechanisms exist within a nation for weighing the interests of different
groups and reconciling conflicts between them. At the international level
such mechanisms are poorly developed. For this reason, it is not relevant
to consider policies that would "benefit the world as a whole," in accord
with some global welfare criterion, unless it can be shown that these
policies are likely to benefit the individual nations that are asked to adopt
them.
Third, while the analysis of policies affecting international economic
integration must take into account the noneconomic concerns relevant to
the broad conception of national welfare, this does not warrant suspen-
sion of the analysis of the economic consequences of such policies. As
Harry Johnson (1960) indicates in his analysis of the "scientific tariff," it
is always appropriate to consider the economic cost of pursuing a noneco-
nomic objective, and to select the policy that achieves the objective at the
least possible cost. Moreover, in assessing policies justified by noneco-
nomic arguments, it is useful to recall the old adage that "patriotism is the
last refuge of a scoundrel."
Fourth, constraints on the policies that governments can adopt and
implement, and distortions which government policies cannot counter-
vail, imply that the appropriate policies with respect to many isues of
economic integration will necessarily be second-best policies that take
account of these constraints and distortions. The necessity of pursuing
second-best policies, however, does not provide a blanket justification
for erecting or expanding artificial barriers to economic integration. For
example, under certain circumstances, the standard infant industry argu-
ment is a valid second-best argument for granting tariff protection to a
domestic industry. The required circumstances are that there be increas-
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increasing returns not be fully appropriable by private investors, that the
first-best policy of a production subsidy not be available, and that the
domestic industry be able to achieve competitiveness (without protec-
tion) within a reasonable time span. The infant industry argument is not a
general warrant for granting protection to all import-competing indus-
tries at very high rates and for prolonged periods.
Moreover, in applying second-best arguments to justify policies that
interfere with economic integration, careful account must be taken of the
distortions that such policies are likely to introduce into the economic
system, as well as the distortions that they are likely to correct. For
example, granting tariff protection to a final goods producer on the basis
of an infant industry argument may lead to increased imports of inputs
used in producing these final goods. Increased imports of such inputs may
lead domestic producers of these inputs to demand protection. Granting
such protection, however, is likely to work to the disadvantage of the
domestic final goods producer who will, in turn, demand greater protec-
tion for his output. Of course, substantial (and temporary) protection of
both the final and intermediate goods industries may be justified if the
infant industry argument (or some other second-best argument for pro-
tection) validly applies to both industries. But, the extent of protection
should not exceed the amount that can initially be justified. The extent of
protection should not be leveraged upward, with each tariff increase for
one class of producers providing the automatic justification for the next
tariff increase for some other class of producers.
Finally, in analyzing policies affecting economic integration, account
must sometimes be taken of important interactions among alternative
channels of integration. Imposing or removing restrictions on trade in
intermediate products will frequently have important consequences for
final goods producers. Similarly, imposing or removing restrictions on
commidity trade may sometimes have important effects on factor move-
ments, and conversely. When these ancillary consequences of policies
directed at one channel of economic integration on other channels of
economic integration are important, then obviously they must be taken
into account in policy formulation. However, the general principle that in
economics everything depends on everything else should not be allowed
to paralyze analysis of what should be presumed to be the primary effects
of a particular policy. If a policy cannot be justified on the basis of careful
analysis of its likely effects in its principal domain of operation, it is
unreasonable to adopt it on the basis of its unspecified and unanalyzed
secondary benefits.58 Michael Mussa
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